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Housing Benefit reform and the private rented sector in the UK: on the deleterious effects 
of short-term, ideological "knowledge"  
Abstract 
This paper draws on the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias in understanding the current 
housing crisis in the UK: one which emphasizes the social interdependencies between 
individuals and groups, and the power relations that characterise them, in explaining household 
behaviour.  It is argued that such an approach can contribute to a better understanding of 
housing processes and their differentiated outcomes.  At the same time, this analysis exposes 
the myriad negative consequences that emerge from short-term housing policies based on static, 
over-simplified assumptions and applied to an ever-increasingly complex housing figuration, 
which is constantly in flux.  These arguments are made with reference to empirical evidence on 
the impact of changes to Housing Benefit in the private rented sector, which shows how 
neoliberal housing policy contributes to long-term detrimental effects on marginalised 
households and groups.  Through this example, it is argued that the governmental presentation 
of welfare reforms differs markedly from the reality of consequences on the ground and 
corresponds to 'neoliberal state-crafting'.  It is suggested that any approach to understanding 
the complexities of the housing system must retain a focus on historical change, precedents and 
fluctuations in power balances to avoid the pernicious "retreat into the present" characteristic 
of policy.  
Key words: housing figurations; housing policy; welfare reform; neoliberal state-crafting; social 
processes; power relations; Norbert Elias. 
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Introduction 
Governmental discourses on housing policy proceed as if it existed in a kind of vacuum: policy-
makers pull levers which precipitate desired changes in the behaviour of obediently responsive 
tenants, households and landlords.  They present policy initiatives and their assumed outcomes 
in static isolation, as if wider social and historical processes were irrelevant; and as if individual 
actors respond directly to policy changes through a calculated (and invariably financial-centred) 
decision-making process which results in the desired outcomes.  As such, housing policy 
consistently ignores the complex web of social interdependencies in which individuals and 
groups negotiating the housing system are enmeshed and which are constantly in flux, changing 
this way and that in line with fluctuations in power balances.  Nowhere is this static, process-
reducing, behaviourist approach more apparent than in the case of the UK coalition 
government's Housing Benefit (HB) reforms which form a central part of the unprecedented 
retraction of welfare support.   
 
This paper draws on the theoretical work of Norbert Elias in taking a figurational perspective 
towards understanding and critiquing the governmental rationalities underpinning the cuts to 
Local Housing Allowance (LHA), the regime for administering HB in the private rented sector 
(PRS) (see Beatty et al., 2012; DWP, 2011).  Early research that has addressed the LHA reforms 
has tended to replicate the government position in terms of retreating into a London-centric 
focus (Hamnett, 2010; Fenton, 2010), or has been guilty of an "over-critique" (Kilminster, 2013) 
in its exaggeration of the impact of reforms.  Both positions are inadequate: the first neglects the 
differentiated and far-reaching impacts outside of the capital; the second closes down debate 
with government simply dismissing such criticisms as "scare-mongering" (Freud, 2012).  This 
paper seeks to bring a degree of balance to the evidence base: firstly in terms of a consideration 
of impacts beyond (but also including) London; and secondly through a more detached, 
empirical perspective which draws on qualitative evidence from landlords and housing advisers 
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dealing directly with the impact of the reforms.  In doing so, it emphasises the differing effects of 
social processes across time and space and their relationship to, and impact on, the social 
interdependencies between tenants, landlords, and local and central government.  This wider 
context is crucial to understanding the impact of the LHA changes and the particular responses 
of those directly affected.  Key social processes relevant to the housing figuration discussed here 
include: deindustrialisation; globalisation; privatization; deregulation; migration; gentrification; 
social polarization; marginalization; disidentification; (territorial) stigmatization; and 
neoliberalization.1  The paper argues that the blanket reforms to LHA are ignorant to the uneven 
effects of these wider social processes, which produce different responses to the LHA measures 
among different groups in different localities.  It argues that housing policy outcomes in the PRS 
are increasingly unplanned and unforeseen as a result of the complexity and lengthening of 
social interdependencies, which serve to constrain or enable behaviour.  With sensitivity to 
these differing contexts it argues that LHA reform only accentuates the negative processes of 
marginalization and stigmatization (both social and spatial) for the least powerful; detrimental 
processes which housing policy should be designed to counter.  In this sense, the arguments 
presented here also speak to recent academic debates on the central role of housing in the 
continuation of market-based reforms to transform the state (Jacobs and Manzi, 2013a, 2013b).  
That is, acknowledging that changes in the policy field of housing are 'part and parcel of a much 
wider, albeit spatially uneven, process of "neoliberalization" across the public sector, welfare 
provision and labour markets' (Hodkinson et al, 2012, p.6).  It therefore responds to Hodkinson 
et al.'s (2012) call for a processual approach to housing which does not isolate tenures and social 
groups but instead considers the relationships and interdependencies between them, as well as 
being sensitive to the impact of wider social and historical processes on the housing field (Cole, 
2006; Jacobs and Manzi, 2013a).  
 
                                            
1 Space constraints do not permit a detailed account of these complex, interdependent processes. Suffice 
to say here that there is a wealth of evidence that corroborates these processes, observable over the 
longer term, which is often at once empirical and theoretical. This literature is far too vast to cite here. 
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The extent and scale of the changes, coupled with the uncertainty and myriad unintended 
consequences they bring, mean that the full impact will take considerable time to filter through 
the system (Beatty et al., 2014).2  The findings presented here therefore focus on the impacts 
and processes evident in the early stages of policy implementation and centre on two very 
different local authorities: Rhondda Cynon Taf (hereafter RCT) in South Wales; and 
Westminster in central London.  The reforms to LHA and their specific impact within RCT and 
Westminster are used as an example of the inadequate and flawed nature of neoliberal housing 
policy here for three reasons.  Firstly, the perceived need for state retrenchment in the form of 
LHA cuts is a direct product of the contraction of the social rented sector and PRS deregulation 
and therefore the current predicament - the high HB bill - is itself an outcome of the failures of 
neoliberal housing policy (i.e. the Right to Buy and the deregulation of rents).  Secondly, the 
example captures the inequalities across both spaces and sections of the population which 
coalesce to produce and perpetuate processes of spatial and social stigmatization and 
marginalization.  Thirdly, though emanating from central government, the immediate fallout 
from the reforms impinges on tenants, landlords, local communities and local authorities and 
therefore provides a telling example of 'neoliberal state crafting' (Wacquant, 2013a).  As we 
shall see, this entails, to paraphrase Nikolas Rose: a shift from an ethos of bureaucracy to the 
private business of the landlord; from planning and allocation to intensive competition between 
tenants with unequal power resources; and from the logic of the housing system to the logic of 
the housing market (Rose, 1999, p.150).  It is further argued that, in the case of RCT, the reforms 
represent a form of territorial stigmatization (Wacquant, 2007) in action: a process of 
marginalising already stigmatized households and social groups contained within an 'area of 
relegation'.  In this sense, what follows also responds to Wacquant's call: 
                                            
2 DWP research monitoring the reforms cites a number of lagged effects in tenant and landlord responses 
related to: a lack of knowledge about the reforms on the part of both landlords and tenants; a nine month 
period of transitional protection in the implementation process for existing tenants; the use of temporary 
Discretionary Housing Payments (more often than not viewed by landlords and housing advisers as 
"delaying the inevitable"); and affected households clinging on to tenancies in a desperate bid to stay in 
their current property and area, which often results in increasing arrears (Beatty et al., 2012, 2013, 2014).   
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'On the institutional front, the consolidation of a new regime of urban marginality begs for a 
focused analysis of the policy moves whereby governments purport to curb, contain, or reduce 
the very poverty that they have paradoxically spawned through economic deregulation, welfare 
retraction and revamping, and urban retrenchment.  It calls in other words, for linking 
changing forms of urban marginality with emerging modalities of state-crafting' 
(Wacquant, 2013a, p.9 - emphasis in original) 
 
The comparative approach adopted underscores the importance of the local housing market 
context in delineating the effects of the LHA cuts and the way in which they are contingent on 
wider social processes.  The focus on Westminster in central London illustrates how longer-
term processes of globalisation, in-migration and the deregulation of housing and financial 
markets, create the context for a distinct set of negative impacts for tenants within an area of 
relative affluence.  While the second case study of RCT illustrates the way in which these very 
same processes operate differently across time and space and impinge on the ability of 
communities and municipal authorities to ameliorate the damaging effects of central policy (see 
also Cole and Furbey, 1994).  That is, in RCT globalisation has led to the deindustrialisation of 
the area and the selective out-migration of its residents resulting in long-term processes of 
economic decline, housing residualisation, marginalization and territorial stigmatization3 
(Wacquant, 2007, 2008a; see also Hancock and Mooney, 2013), which are accentuated rather 
than remedied by these reforms.  Thus, though the geographical and social contexts of the two 
areas are poles apart, the consequences of LHA reform for the least powerful households and 
groups are consistently negative; yet shaped in specific ways by the context and relations in 
which they are embedded.  The result is a dual process of the containment of marginality in 
spaces of relegation and its dispersal in spaces of affluence.   
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections.  The first sets out the reforms to LHA 
focusing on the rationale for their implementation and the expected outcomes they are designed 
to achieve in terms of altering the behaviour of tenants and landlords in a particular direction.  
                                            
3 See the Special Issue of Environment and Planning A, 2014, volume 46. 
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The second explores the complexities of the interdependencies which constitute the PRS 
through a figurational lens.  The third section draws on empirical evidence from a large scale 
research study monitoring the impacts of the LHA reforms in order to illustrate the importance 
of wider social processes in determining the housing outcomes and responses of different 
groups.  This section focuses on the two examples at either end of the spectrum of housing 
markets in the UK: Westminster and RCT.  The fourth section discusses the findings in relation 
to recent debates on urban marginalization, housing marketization and neoliberalization.  The 
paper concludes that while the reforms may produce the government's desired outcomes in 
some areas (see Beatty et al., 2014), they have also set in train long-term and negative 
consequences which are distributed unevenly across the UK, play out in distinctly different 
ways, but invariably impinge on the least powerful and already marginalized. 
  
The LHA cuts 
Academic and media coverage of Housing Benefit reform has been extensive.  Most prominent 
within these discourses are the "bedroom tax" and the overall household benefit cap.  Much less 
attention has been paid to the reforms to LHA.  This is surprising given the recent and rapid 
expansion of the PRS and the fact that overall cuts to LHA amount to £1.65 billion per annum 
nationally; in comparison to £490m for the bedroom tax and £270m for the overall benefit cap 
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2013, p.10).  Furthermore, the LHA reforms affect 1.35m households, 
compared to 660,000 and 56,000 affected by the bedroom tax and the overall benefit cap, 
respectively (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013, p.10).  The reforms to LHA, then, are a key mechanism 
of the government's welfare retrenchment but the marginal position of the PRS and its tenants 
appears to be mirrored, to some degree, in terms of the prominent discourses opposing welfare 
cuts.   
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The stated principles guiding LHA reform are threefold: to reduce the overall HB bill and exert 
downward pressure on rents; to encourage tenants into work, or to work longer hours (one 
third of LHA tenants are already in work (Beatty et al., 2014)); to make the HB system "fairer".  
These objectives are set out within the DWP's own Impact Assessment: 
'The 2011 changes to the Local Housing Allowance arrangements will both significantly reduce 
the levels of rent met by Housing Benefit in expensive areas and apply downward pressure 
on expenditure more generally. Currently, people can pay high rents in some areas because of 
the availability of Housing Benefit. These changes will mean that people on benefit cannot 
choose to live in properties that would be out of the reach of most people in work and will 
result in a fairer and more sustainable Housing Benefit scheme. They will also begin to 
address disincentives to work in the current system created by high rates of benefit. The 
measures will achieve cash-terms benefit savings of around £1 billion by 2014/15' (DWP, 2010, 
p.1 - my emphasis). 
 
In 2010/11 HB expenditure was £21.61 billion (or 14 per cent of total benefits expenditure), an 
increase of 5 per cent over the previous year.  There are sharp regional variations however.  In 
2009/10, for example, London accounted for 26 per cent of all HB expenditure in Great Britain 
(Hull et al., 2011).  The primary reason for such rapid expenditure growth has been the rise in 
caseloads during and after the recession, with an increase of almost 750,000 people claiming HB 
between 2007/8 and 2010/11. It is important to acknowledge however, that the increasing HB 
bill is also a product of deregulation under the Housing Act of 1988, which formed a key part of 
the Thatcher government's privatisation of housing provision (Crook and Kemp, 2011). This 
marked a huge shift from the previously regulated "fair rents system" to assured tenancies at 
market rents (see Crook and Kemp, 2011, pp.25-39).  This, along with the other key policy in 
that government's marketization of housing, the Right to Buy (which enabled Council tenants to 
purchase their own homes below market prices and served to deplete levels of social housing 
provision), is central to understanding the current crisis and recent rapid tenure change 
described below.  The LHA scheme was introduced for new claimants living in the deregulated 
PRS in April 2008 (for detailed information on the design and workings of the LHA system see: 
DWP, 2011; Kemp, 2007; Crook and Kemp, 2011).    The LHA is a flat rate allowance for different 
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size of property in a Broad Rental Market Area4.   Under the original LHA scheme, the LHA for 
different sizes of property was calculated by the Valuation Office Agency with reference to the 
median rent for that property type.   The package of LHA reforms were announced by the 
Coalition government in its June 2010 budget (see Beatty et al., 2012, 2013, 2014).  These are:5 
 Changing the basis for setting LHA rates from the median to the 30th percentile of local 
market rents (i.e. effectively lowering rates from the average market rent to the lowest 
30 per cent.  In theory, this means that the new LHA rates will cover the rent of only 30 
per cent of properties, where previously this was 50 per cent.  In reality, however, the 
proportion of the PRS available to HB tenants is lower in both cases as many landlords 
express an aversion to letting to HB tenants under any circumstances (see Beatty et 
al.,2014)); 
 Capping LHA rates;6  
 Uprating LHA rates by the Consumer Price Index (rather than the higher Retail Price 
Index); 
 Uprating non-dependent deductions7 to reflect rent increases since 2001/2; 
 Raising the age at which the Shared Accommodation Rate (formerly the Single Room 
Rate) applies from 25 to 35;  
 removing the £15 excess payable to tenants whose rent was below what they were 
receiving in Housing Benefit;  
                                            
4 A Broad Rental Market Area is defined as two or more distinct areas of residential accommodation that 
may constitute part of a local authority area, or cut across two, three or four local authority areas (see 
Beatty et al., 2014) 
5 See Beatty, et al., 2012, 2014; DWP, 2010 for a full account of the changes.  All these changes (apart from 
the withdrawal of the £15 excess) applied to new claimants from April 2011.  Existing claimants were 
brought under these measures (depending on the date of the annual review of their LHA claim) in the 
period from January 2012 to December 2012. 
6
  The caps were set at £250 per week for a 1 bed property: £290 per week for a 2 bed; £340 for a 3 bed; 
and £400 for a 4 bed or more (thereby scrapping the 5 bed rate). 
7 Non-dependent deductions represent reductions in the amount of HB paid to claimants where there are 
other non-dependent adults living in the same property (e.g. offspring aged 18 or over), Tellingly, the 
definition of young adults, who should be living in the parental home rather than claiming HB, is extended 
to those aged 34 in relation to changes to the Shared Accommodation Rate.  
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 )ncreasing the governmentǯs contribution to the Discretionary (ousing Payment budget 
by £10m in 2011/12 and £40 million by 2012/13;8   
 Amending the size criteria to provide an extra bedroom for disabled claimants who have 
a non-resident carer.  
 
Leaving aside the last two mitigating policy instruments cited above, despite the three different 
stated aims of the reforms, the policy mechanism for bringing about the desired changes in the 
behaviour of tenants and landlords is exactly the same: a reduction in HB entitlements.  It is 
assumed that such a reduction will result in four possible outcomes.  Either tenants will: 
negotiate a lower rent with their landlords; move into employment or take on extra hours; 
move to an area and/or property where rents are cheaper; or find the money from elsewhere 
(savings, borrowing or cutting back on household spending).  The policy changes were 
announced in 2010 and aside from a desk-based impact assessment at the national scale, 
conducted internally by the Department for Work and Pensions, there was no official research 
into the likely effects of the reforms.  Among those working with and for tenants, however, 
vociferous concerns were raised about the effects on those claimants who will not be able to 
"bridge the gap" between what they receive in HB and the rent charged (Beatty et al., 2012).  
The government position has remained wedded to the policy assumptions and the conclusion 
drawn from the impact assessment that the 'benefits of the reforms justify the costs' (DWP, 
2010).   
 
HB reforms cannot be seen in isolation from other welfare reforms taking place 
simultaneously.9  The reforms to LHA are just one aspect of the unprecedented overhaul of the 
                                            
8
 Discretionary Housing Payments are intended to mitigate the impact on tenants and can be paid to 
claimants where there is a shortfall between the benefit paid and the contractual rent.  Councils are 
expected to take into account any special circumstances facing the tenants. 
9
 While areas of housing policy are devolved to the Welsh Government and therefore subject to different 
institutional arrangements to that in England, the Welfare Reform Act applies to both nations.  
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welfare system since the financial crisis of 2008 (see Beatty and Fothergill, 2013).  Since April 
2013 this includes capping household benefits at £500 per week (or £350 per week for single 
households).  This measure was introduced in autumn 2013 and has consequences for larger 
households and those living in areas where housing rents are particularly high, such as central 
London.  A ten per cent reduction in central funding for Council Tax Benefit for working age 
households in Great Britain has also been in place since April 2013.10  Changes to Disability 
Living Allowance, Incapacity Benefit and Employment and Support Allowance, and the 
introduction of Personal Independence Payments, were also introduced according to various 
timescales from April 2011 onwards.11  In terms of the overall financial impact of welfare 
reform: 'as a general rule, the more deprived the local authority, the greater the financial hit' 
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2013, p.3).  Westminster is the exception here and is second in the list of 
affected local authorities in terms of the overall impact of all welfare reforms by 2014/15.  
Expressed as the financial loss per working age adult per annum Westminster loses £820, and is 
second only to Blackpool (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013).  This is because 'the Housing Benefit 
reforms and the household benefit cap lead to very large financial losses' but 'the impact of 
other welfare reforms on Westminster is far more modest' (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013, pp.14-
15).  RCT comes in as the 20th worst affected district in Great Britain with a loss of £670 per 
working age adult per year - a huge sum for an isolated, deindustrialised economy characterised 
by a long-term deficit in labour demand and low paid, insecure work.   The complexities here 
are clear.  For households who have been affected by one or more of these other welfare reform 
measures, it is naturally difficult for policy-makers to predict, or for researchers to disentangle, 
the exact impact of the changes to LHA.  Moreover, the plethora of welfare reforms have been 
implemented against a backdrop of housing flux with the PRS growing at a rapid rate and 
                                            
10  The implementation of the new Council Tax Reduction scheme was devolved to local areas and the 
Scottish and Welsh Governments along with 57 English districts, including Westminster, decided not to 
pass the reduction onto claimants.   
11 Universal Credit, the government's flagship welfare reform, is not discussed here due to uncertainty 
and vagueness surrounding its implementation.  However, the myriad problems associated with the 
reform testify to the disjuncture between the complex reality of housing and welfare reform and the 
ideological knowledge driving it. 
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owner-occupation and the social rented sector, where rents are comparatively cheaper, 
shrinking.  National figures show that the number of households living in the PRS in England 
increased by 25 per cent between 2008/9 and 2011/12 (DCLG, 2013).  This growth of the PRS 
alongside the contraction in other tenures meant that the share of all households in England 
living in the PRS had risen to 17 per cent by 2011/12.  For the first time since the 1960s the PRS 
was on a par with the social rented sector, which also accounted for 17 per cent of all 
households - significantly below its peak of over 30 per cent in the 1980s (BSHF, 2010). This is 
in contrast to trends in other western countries over the last 15 years where the PRS is stable 
(e.g. Germany, Norway, Sweden, US) or has continued to decline (e.g. Belgium); the exception 
being Australia which also shows an increase (see Scanlon, 2011; Crook and Kemp, 2014).  
Table 1 below illustrates how the PRS is increasingly taking the strain of the housing crisis with 
a 267 per cent increase in the LHA caseload between 2008 and 2013. 
Table 1 here 
 
This shift is central to accounts of the housing marketization process (Malpass and Victory, 2010; 
Jacobs and Manzi, 2013a, 2013b) driven by the privatization of social housing through the Right 
to Buy (Cole and Furbey, 1994; Hodkinson et al., 2012), stock transfer (Ginsburg, 2005; Watt, 
2009), and the deregulation of housing finance (Kennett et al., 2013).  All of which have 
contributed to inevitable and significant HB growth within the PRS, which was acknowledged by 
the Minister for Welfare Reform, Lord Freud, in a 2012 speech to the National Landlords 
Association:  
"Firstly I want to congratulate private sector landlords for the important role they have played 
in the economy as a whole. You have been of huge value during these recent turbulent times. 
Taking over 590,000 extra tenants on Housing Benefit, an increase of over 50% - for which we 
are extremely grateful" (Lord Freud, 2012), 
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In recent years the PRS can be characterised as an unregulated sector undergoing rapid 
transformation and in a state of flux12, all of which hampers our limited understanding and 
makes predicting behaviour based on static conceptions a nigh on impossible task. 
 
One size fits all: the LHA cuts and the local context 
It is instructive to consider what these blanket LHA changes mean in the context of the two 
different localities.  Table 2 below illustrates the diversity of the PRS context across the case 
study areas.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
The more enlightening columns for our concerns here are the last three to the right.  Taking 
each in turn, firstly, the percentage of HB claimants as a proportion of all PRS households is a 
crucial context in understanding the responses of landlords and hints at the alternative options, 
or not, available to them.  For instance, in Westminster HB tenants in the PRS account for just 16 
per cent of the total suggesting a relatively differentiated PRS (this is discussed in more detail 
below).   In contrast, in RCT the PRS is dominated by tenants in receipt of HB, who account for a 
massive 60 per cent of all PRS households, and points to a more homogeneous social 
composition of the sector and a relative lack of alternative tenants (and alternative uses of their 
properties) for landlords.  Secondly, house prices are an important consideration for landlord 
and tenant behaviour.  The explosion in the Buy-to-Let market means that many landlords must 
command a certain rent in order to cover mortgage payments and accrue a profit.  Furthermore, 
where prices are rising and where landlords are not in negative equity they are more likely to 
consider selling properties as a response to the reduced income from the LHA cuts: a more 
                                            
12 Turnover in the PRS is also relatively high with 34 per cent of households moving within the last year.  
This compares to ten per cent in the social rented sector and just four per cent in owner-occupation (CLG, 
2014). 
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feasible option in a buoyant housing market such as Westminster.  In areas where house prices 
are high relative to wages LHA tenants are also more likely to face intense competition from 
suppressed homebuyers diverted to the PRS.  Finally, the proportion of residents in the area on 
out-of-work benefits serves as a proxy for the relative health of the labour market and economic 
activity.  Each of these differences, among many others, has a bearing on local rent levels.   
 
Table 3 below shows the weekly LHA rates in RCT and Westminster.  The March 2011 LHA rates 
were the last month when rents were based on the median rents in the respective Broad Rental 
Market Area and thus present the pre-reform picture.  The April 2011 rates were based on the 
new rules of the 30th percentile of market rents in the area and the maximum caps by bedroom 
size.  The rates at December 2012 show what happened to rents in the immediate period after 
the LHA reforms were implemented.  The final column gives the difference between the pre-
reform LHA rate and the current one.  Comparing pre-reform LHA rates it is clear to see why 
much of the academic and media attention has focused on central London where market rents 
are so much higher; and how London could account for over a quarter of the HB bill yet only 
around 16 per cent of claims (Hamnett, 2010).  The average rent for a two-bed property in 
Westminster was a massive £550 a week for instance, leaving LHA tenants with a shortfall of 
£260 per week post-implementation.  In contrast, rents in RCT were already very low prior to 
the LHA reforms with little room for manoeuvre in terms of rent deflation, a desired policy goal 
of the reforms.  Nevertheless, a reduction in LHA of £10 a week, or around £40 per month, for a 
one bedroom property in the Merthyr Cynon Broad Rental Market Area is a sizeable gap 
between the LHA rate and the contractual rent for anyone getting by on a low income.  As noted, 
LHA reforms basically amount to reducing HB entitlements and therefore increasing the gap 
between average market rents and LHA entitlements to induce desired behaviours.  This gap is 
far greater in Inner London than in other parts of the UK and the caps per bedroom size only 
come into play there at present (as shown in Table 3).  That is, the 30th percentile in some Broad 
15 
 
Rental Market Areas in Inner London is higher than the caps per bedroom size; for everywhere 
else in the country the reverse is true.   
Table 3 here 
It is worth reiterating that the policies are anticipated to have the same impact across the 
country: a reduction in the HB Bill and downward pressure on rents; introducing "fairness" into 
the welfare system; and encouraging people into work.  However, given the very different pre-
reform contexts of RCT and Westminster it appears safe to assert that, at least to some extent, 
the reforms to LHA were devised by policy-makers with the increasingly globalized and 
gentrified London housing market in mind, with little consideration of the rental market in "low 
demand" areas like RCT.  This is consistent with the stated policy goals of course: the overriding 
objective is to reduce the overall HB bill and in 2011 26 per cent of that bill was accounted for 
by London.   The movement of LHA tenants from central London was therefore an explicit policy 
goal expressed in terms of "fairness": 'These changes will mean that people on benefit cannot 
choose to live in properties that would be out of the reach of most people in work' (DWP, 2010).  
Indeed, extreme examples of relatively large households in receipt of LHA in central London 
were consistently used by government as a means of mobilising the disidentifications of "hard 
working families" (read middle-class voters) and garnering support for the reforms (see Slater, 
2014).  The fact that a third of LHA claimants are already in work, rising to 40 per cent in 
London (Beatty et al., 2014), is notable by its absence from that discourse.  The potential 
impacts in low-rent, peripheral, deindustrialised spaces like RCT received little attention.  A 
comparative analysis of Westminster and RCT is therefore particularly suited to understanding 
the consequences at opposite ends of the spectrum of UK housing markets.  Given the 
dominance of London-centric discourses, such an analysis also highlights the neglected and 
significant consequences of the reforms for areas of 'dereliction wherein the precarized and 
stigmatized fractions of the postindustrial working class concentrate' (Wacquant, 2013a, p.9).  
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The case of RCT also questions the dominance of the urban in studying the processes associated 
with neoliberal state-crafting. 
 
The PRS housing figuration 
Norbert Elias's figurational sociology provides a particularly useful framework for exposing the 
inadequacies of the static and reductionist behavioural assumptions on which the LHA reforms 
are based.  Figuration is the term used by Elias to refer to 'the modes of living together of 
humans' (Elias in Kilminster, 2014: 6).  It is a direct response to the intellectual aberration of 
the homo clausus - the closed subject prevalent within philosophical thinking which separates 
the individual from society.  For Elias dominant conceptions of the relationship between the 
individual and society are naively egocentric, seeing either:  
1 society as a mass of individuals; their properties and development are the outcome of 
individual actions; or 
2 societies as existing outside the individuals and figurations who form them (Mennell & 
Goudsblom, 1998, p.240) 
These conceptualisations lead to the reification and dehumanization of social structures: society 
cannot be separated from the individual, or from human figurations, as 'social forces are in fact 
forces exerted by people over one another and over themselves' (Elias, 1978, p.17).  A 
figurational approach therefore emphasizes the interdependence of human beings whose lives 
are significantly shaped by the figurations that they form with others; these figurations are 
constantly changing in many ways - some fast, some slower and longer lasting; the long-term 
processual (or developmental) nature of figurations are unplanned and unforeseen; and the 
development of knowledge takes place within these figurations (Goudsblom, 1977).  Over the 
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long-term13 the increasing differentiation and specialization of social functions, under pressures 
of competition, results in an ever increasing number of interdependencies for the individual and 
groups as the webs of interdependence across societies grow.  No-one controls the overall 
direction, rather social development is the outcome of figurational dynamics which are 
constantly in a state of flux as the power balances within them change alongside wider social 
transformations.  The concept of figuration therefore 'directs attention towards shifting 
patterns, regularities, directions of change, tendencies and counter-tendencies, in webs of 
human relationships that are always changing over time' (Dunning and Hughes, 2013, p.52). 
 
When we approach the PRS in this way it is not difficult to see that the state is but one social 
force acting upon the behaviour of tenants and landlords, who themselves are locked into a 
relationship of interdependence with each other, characterised by different power imbalances.  
Even if we over-simplify the PRS figuration for our purposes here this fact becomes apparent.  
For example, a tenant in receipt of LHA is locked into an interdependent relationship with: the 
wider household she forms part of; the state in the form of the LHA rules and level of payment; 
the local authority which administers LHA and interprets those rules; the landlord who, in 
theory, can decide to let to who she wants at what level rent she wants; and with other PRS 
tenants in direct competition for properties.  This latter point is further accentuated by the 
expansion of Higher Education and increased international migration which have increased 
competition from students and migrant workers respectively.  The deregulation, expansion and 
differentiation of the PRS have also increased the diversity of landlords operating within it.  
Landlords are an extremely diverse bunch from "accidental landlords" (with one or two 
inherited properties) to letting agents to large-scale managing agents and overseas investors 
with sizeable property portfolios.  Their responses to the LHA cuts are therefore shaped by their 
                                            
13 Long-term in the Eliasian sense is the very long-term in the conventional sociological sense.  For 
example, Elias consistently returns to much earlier societies in garnering insights on social processes, in 
the same vein as Marx and Weber (see Elias, 1987a, 1987b). 
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relative positions within the PRS figuration, with those responses in turn impacting on their 
tenants.  Furthermore, the PRS figuration is shaped by its interdependence with other housing 
sectors.  For example, the housing market crash in 2008 led to a huge increase in PRS demand 
from suppressed homebuyers unable to access mortgage finance, which served to intensify the 
competition for PRS properties for LHA tenants and conferred a relative shift in power to 
landlords in some areas of high demand.  Similarly, the contraction of the social rented sector 
has placed greater pressures on the PRS as it is increasingly expected to absorb excess demand 
for social housing.  These are just a few of the more obvious social interdependencies which 
impinge upon the ability of tenants and landlords to negotiate their way through an ever more 
complex, expansive and differentiated PRS figuration.  The chains of interdependence go on and 
on (see Elias, 1978).  Seen in this perspective the simplicity of the stated aims of the LHA 
reforms appear absurd.  It is therefore imperative that housing and urban scholars 'make 
reference to historical processes to uncover ideological assumptions behind policies that are 
presented as simple or "common-sense" solutions' (Jacobs and Manzi, 2013, p.41).  Or, in Elias's 
terms, an appreciation of long-term social processes and their development enables a shift to a 
more empirically-driven and reality-congruent fund of knowledge, as opposed to one that is 
ideologically-driven and statically orientated.  A figurational approach also demands a focus on 
power relations and how these are shaped by longer-term, wider social processes; an approach 
that goes far beyond an acknowledgement that "context matters" by drawing attention to 
differential impacts across space, time and groups.  It is relatively common for housing and 
urban scholars to fall into the same trap as the housing policies which they research and 'retreat 
into the present', neglecting the processual and developmental nature of society14 (see Cole, 
2006; Elias, 1987b; Flint and Powell, 2012; Rae, 2011).  'Thinking in essentially static terms, we 
                                            
14 I would suggest that the extensive empirical and theoretical work of Loїc Wacquant, and those 
influenced by him, represents a significant breakthrough for urban and housing studies in this regard.  
Though owing much of its development to the work of Wacquant's mentor and collaborator, Pierre 
Bourdieu, it shares a number of similarities with the "research-theorising" characteristic of Elias's 
figurational sociology (see Dunning and Hughes, 2013, pp.188-200; Rodger, 2012).  That is, Wacquant's 
work on the development of the urban form learns from the past, and is invariably empirical, theoretical, 
relational, historical, and sensitive to the sociology of knowledge (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; see 
also Wacquant (2004b) for an engagement with Elias on the "dark ghetto").  
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are compelled to seek to identify the "active" or "prime mover", as well as the "moved", "acted 
upon" or passive "recipient" of "change"…questions which are themselves flawed in certain 
respects' (Dunning and Hughes, 2013, p.115).  Elias's rejection of static concepts and insistence 
on the perpetual dynamism of human interdependencies acts as a particularly helpful 
theoretical tool in aiding an understanding of housing in flux. 
 
It is not difficult to see that the static assumptions underpinning LHA reform, and their 
presentation as common-sense, are far from adequate.  The LHA measures and their impact 
serve as a particularly illustrative example of neoliberal state-crafting due to the way in which 
central government is able to transfer the associated risks to tenants, landlords and local 
authorities (see also Blandy and Hunter, 2012).  Just as 'the genius of the Right to Buy was that…tenants themselves became the main agents of privatization' ȋ(odkinson et al, ʹͲͳʹ, p.͹Ȍ, 
the perceived efficiency of the LHA reforms rests on the fact that, at least in the short-term, the 
state simply retreats while others respond; hopefully in the way that the government anticipates.  
However, these policies of state retrenchment and the transfer of risk carry with them the 
potential for major housing and urban problems in the future as individual and household 
behaviours, enmeshed in complex figurations, inevitably produce undesirable consequences 
(Dunning and Hughes, 2013).  In this context welfare cuts to HB in the PRS can be seen to form 
part of the 'spread and normalization of social insecurity at the bottom of the class ladder' 
(Wacquant, 2013a, p.6).  It is to these consequences and their uneven geographical and social 
impact that we now turn.      
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LHA "reform" and its discontents 
This section draws on evidence from qualitative interviews with landlords15 and frontline 
housing advisers16, as well as four focus groups with the latter, in illustrating the complexities of 
landlord and tenant responses to the LHA reforms.17  The research programme ran from April 
2011 until May 2014 and involved different strands, but this section draws solely on the 
qualitative insights from those dealing with the fallout of the reforms (see Beatty et al., 2012, 
2013, 2014 for a full account of the different research elements and the methods employed).  
Five in-depth interviews were conducted with landlords in each of the nineteen case study 
areas between January and April 2013 - a total of 95 interviews.  Similarly, 95 qualitative, in-
depth interviews were conducted with housing advisers and officers from both the public and 
voluntary and community sectors across the 19 areas (five per area), with these taking place in 
the summer of 2012.   
 
The empirical material presented focuses on RCT and Westminster, though evidence from 
respondents in other areas is also drawn upon where relevant.  The analysis captures two 
distinct narratives pertaining to the least powerful households shaped by the specific context of 
power relations which characterise the PRS housing figuration within the two districts: a 
narrative of displacement and dispersal in the globalised spaces of central London; and one of 
containment, abandonment and dereliction in the deindustrialised spaces of RCT.   
 
                                            
15 The landlord sample included landlords, letting agents and managing agents and these groups are not 
mutually exclusive.  Where referring to the collective sample the term "landlords" is used.  Where 
respondents are quoted their position of "landlord", or "letting agent", or "landlord and letting agent", is 
indicated. 
16 The housing adviser sample contained a mix of representatives from the 19 local authority case studies 
in the research as well as those from the voluntary and community sector operating in those areas, such 
as the Citizens Advice Bureau, Crisis, Porchlight, Shelter etc. (see Beatty et al., 2013).  Where referring to 
the collective, the generic term "advisers" is used.   
17 For a detailed account of the research methods see Beatty et al., 2012, 2013, 2014. 
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Marginalization in London 
The PRS in the UK is incredibly diverse, notoriously unregulated and increasingly the only 
option for vulnerable and low income households who would have previously been housed in 
the social rented sector.  Rapid PRS change presents problems for local authority housing 
departments, themselves undergoing severe cuts to staff and services, tasked with "regulating" 
the PRS but with less and less resources with which to do so: 
"The community legal centre is overwhelmed with queries and problems from private rented tenants 
with everything from arrears, disrepairs to evictions and harassment from landlords…That's coupled 
with the fact that the private rented sector in Barking and Dagenham has increased from about 9% 
about six years ago to 17% now. We've got something like 12,000 private rented sector properties of which we're lucky if we know where Ͷ,ͲͲͲ of them are…invisible (MOs18 are growing in this borough" 
(Barking and Dagenham adviser focus group)  
"It's so widely known the sector is completely unregulated and you can get away with anything.  And 
the demand is so great and people will put up with almost anything" (Housing adviser, Brent) 
 
The private sector is increasingly the destination for HB tenants due to processes of 
privatization and deregulation: through the shift from the regulation and bureaucratic 
management of social housing allocations, to the free market and open competition of the PRS.  
Local housing market and migration processes are therefore fundamental in determining the 
relative position and power of LHA tenants and landlords within the PRS figuration.  In 
Westminster, the balance of power is firmly in the hands of the landlord in terms of the 
response to the LHA reforms: 
"Central London, this location is not reliant on only [Housing Benefit] tenants. There's all walks of life 
from all over the world coming to live here, to work here, study here…The attraction with the LHA 
tenant was a long term tenancy and they were paying slightly higher but then you were taking a lot of 
risks, responsibilities" (Westminster landlord)  
"It's very healthy, there's no shortage of tenants… privately or on housing benefit, but the housing 
benefit tenants tend to lose out" (Westminster landlord) 
 
                                            
18
 HMO refers to Housing of Multiple Occupation where certain common areas of the property are shared 
by more than one household such as the entrance, the kitchen and the bathroom.  
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The level of demand for rental property in the centre of a global city like London gives landlords 
the upper hand in terms of their relationship with existing LHA tenants: they are on the 
favourable side of an asymmetric power balance accentuated by the cuts.  Tenants experiencing a 
significant shortfall between their contractual rent and their reduced LHA entitlement must find 
the income from other sources, reduce spending, move somewhere cheaper, or face eviction.   
"What you've got now, no private landlord will rent to the DSS19, it's not economical" (Westminster 
landlord). "Our outlook to housing benefit applicants has changed considerably…because they've been priced out 
of the market by the private tenants, the LHA is far less than what the property will achieve on the 
open market" (Barking and Dagenham landlord) 
"Yeah we've got rid of, we've basically changed our demographic, we've only got a handful of families 
left, it's been a massive change, and no under 35s, maybe one or two" (Westminster landlord and 
letting agent). 
 
Landlords have no need to "take a risk" on LHA tenants, safe in the knowledge that demand 
from non-LHA tenants is so healthy.  Continued financial deregulation since the 1980s means 
that housing markets 'are now deeply embedded within the international institutional 
architecture and financial flows' (Kennett et al., 2013, p.11).  The growth of the Buy-to-Let 
market in the UK bears testament to these processes, with new lending cases rising from 44,000 
in 1999 to 346,000 in 2007 (Kennet et al., 2013); trends mirrored in other countries exhibiting a 
growth in small-scale Buy-to-Let landlords such as France and Spain (see Crook and Kemp, 
2014; Scanlon, 2011).  These globalisation processes ensure that global cities like London (and 
indeed Paris and Madrid) are seen as a "safe bet" for international investors looking to invest in 
property given the economic buoyancy of the city, high rates of economic activity, strong PRS 
demand among wealthy residents, and continued house price inflation.20  A recent Report on 
                                            
19
 "DSS" refers to the former UK government Department of Social Security which was replaced by the 
Department for Work and Pensions in 2001.  Curiously, "DSS" is still the preferred term of many 
landlords when referring to HB tenants and advertisements for PRS properties often include the 
statement "No DSS" reflecting an aversion to HB tenants among landlords. 
20 As a recent Deutsche Bank Report notes: 'London housing may be expensive relative to the UK, but itǯs a 
bargain for some foreigners. Given the international nature of its real estate market, London house prices 
are perhaps better measured in dollars than sterling. The 30 per cent fall in GBP/USD following the 
financial crisis therefore provided foreign investors with a considerable boost in purchasing power. 
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overseas investment in London concluded: 'London property is now seen for many in terms of 
its investment potential, as a safe haven for cash in an unstable global climate, rather than 
something that should be meeting a basic social need for the capital's residents' (Green and 
Bentley, 2014, p.2). 
 
This is certainly borne out by the process of marginalization experienced by many LHA tenants 
in central London.  Given the huge shortfalls between LHA entitlements and rents, the impacts 
fall unevenly on: the tenant, who invariably has to find cheaper accommodation elsewhere and 
probably some distance from their current address, social networks, workplace etc.; and the 
local authority, which has to source ever more scarce (if not non-existent) suitable 
accommodation for an increasing number of evicted and often vulnerable tenants presenting as 
homeless.   
"Our [homelessness] acceptances went up after LHA came in 86 per cent.  In 2009 nine per cent of the 
households we accepted were from private sector and that went up to 64 per cent of our acceptances 
in 2012/13.  That's a massive hike which was a direct reflection of people being served notice or us 
deciding that their accommodation was unaffordable because of the LHA cap" (Westminster Adviser 
Focus Group) 
 
"We're looking at Birmingham as a cheap option, I should say the West Midlands, Coventry, if we can 
get people to Milton Keynes and Luton, it depends what the customer wants in some respects" (Brent 
Housing Adviser) 
 
This accommodation is likely to be some distance from central London, and increasingly outside 
London altogether as outer London Boroughs feel the impact of displacement (i.e. less property 
available and higher rents), and inner boroughs are forced to discharge their housing duty.21 
                                                                                                                                       
Measured against other major global cities, for example, London prices look relatively cheap compared to 
Hong Kong' (Oliver, 2013, p.12) 
21 For example, where tenants are evicted and present to the local authority as homeless, then the 
authority has a duty to find them "suitable" accommodation.  Should, for instance, Brent Council be 
unable to find affordable accommodation within the Borough then they must look further afield.  
Increasingly, given the impact of LHA caps and the overall benefit cap, this accommodation is outside the 
Borough and sometimes London altogether (e.g. Luton, the Midlands, the North).  If the tenant then 
refuses that accommodation, the Council can discharge its housing duty and no longer has any obligations 
to house that tenant. 
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") think in reality what's more likely to happen is that people…may end up making homeless 
applications or whatever, they'll be made an offer of private sector or temporary accommodation 
somewhere they don't want to go and they'll turn it down and we'll end up ceasing our duty to them 
for that reason" (Westminster Adviser Focus Group) 
 
In general terms then, the Westminster landlord is faced with the inconvenience of replacing 
her LHA tenants with non-LHA tenants, while displaced households and the local authorities 
deal with the consequences.  In some cases this is at great cost in the form of temporary and 
emergency accommodation, with families in bed and breakfast accommodation at a ten year 
high (Spurr, 2014).   
 
Across London, advisers spoke of the emergence and/or accentuation of processes of housing 
segmentation within London neighbourhoods. LHA claimants in central London are increasingly 
being channelled to specific areas of lower quality, cheaper PRS accommodation as much of the 
capital becomes unaffordable.   
"It tends to be owners of tatty old property.  They can't get decent tenants for what they have to offer 
so once again that sections the area, the cheaper area the landlords will [let to Housing benefit 
tenants], the better areas they just will not " (Barking and Dagenham letting agent) 
"What we're starting to see in Brent though is some areas becoming almost no go for housing benefit 
tenants…So the borough's getting a bit split now into areas where landlords are willing to drop their 
rents down to the LHA level, accepting that they're generally going to have housing benefit tenants, 
and areas where landlords are pulling out of the market and just renting to people who are working" 
(Brent Housing Adviser) 
 
In many cases, given the strong attachments to place within London and the positive function of 
particular ethnic enclaves (e.g. the Somali community in Brent), many households were 
"choosing" to overcrowd, thereby enabling them to remain within their current area.   
"If you speak to housing officers, they're concerned about overcrowding, sub-standard accommodation…people are choosing to stay in the borough, moving to smaller properties and 
choosing to overcrowd rather than move out of Brent, especially in certain communities where they've 
got a network of support in this borough and real reasons to stay" (Brent Housing Adviser) 
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Advisers and landlords invariably referred to the areas tenants were channelled to as the 
"bottom end" of the PRS, with many expressing concerns over "bad landlordism" and tenant 
exploitation.  Given the webs of interdependence that characterise the PRS figuration these 
impacts go and on through the figurational chain.  Although the channelling and marginalisation 
of LHA tenants is more marked and discernible in central London, these impacts are felt much 
further afield as displacement processes filter down through the housing system.  The landlord 
below discusses the case of Jaywick in Tendring, Essex, a classic candidate for the processes 
associated with territorial stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2007, 2008a).22  These displacement and 
marginalisation processes were evident in Jaywick before the reforms but are accentuated 
further by them: 
"I think Clacton changed, we'd gone away from being a nice seaside town, people still like to retire 
here but we've also had this deluge from some of the London boroughs where people have been placed down here in rented accommodation….more benefit claimants have moved down to the area 
and they have a policy now of moving these prisoners and their families into homes in Jaywick, it's a 
shanty town, wooden buildings" (Tendring landlord) 
 
Many advisers spoke of this as the beginning of a longer-term process as the impact of the 
reforms works its way through the chains of interdependent power relations within the PRS 
figuration: 
"I think the way it'll continue, if you put the city of London at the centre, everything will just, it just 
ripples on, so you move to there, a year later you'll move on, a year later move on " (Barking and 
Dagenham Adviser Focus Group) 
 
Ultimately this contributes to the gentrification of an over-heated London housing market (see 
Lees et al., 2010, Watt, 2009), driven by an economy dramatically out of kilter with the rest of 
the UK (Harvey, 2013), as LHA tenants are replaced by wealthier households, not just in central 
London but further out: 
                                            
22 According to the Indices of Multiple Deprivation - a Government measure drawing on indicators for 
income, employment, health, crime and living standards - Jaywick is the poorest place in England but 
many residents are resistant to the taint of place imposed from above (Usborne, 2012). 
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"Hackney advertises itself as this trendy fashion hub and a media centre and it's attracting lots of 
young professionals who can't buy or don't want to buy cos it's a stepping stone to somewhere else, so 
you've got the conflict of the local population and Hackney bringing in lots of money, they can pay 
council tax but they take up the accommodation that the sons and daughters of the indigenous 
population can't compete with" (Hackney Adviser Focus Group) 
 
A telling reminder of the neoliberal roots of these processes can be found in the fact that, 
ironically, LHA tenants are often channelled to ex-Council properties.  These have ended up in 
the hands of landlords as a result of the Right to Buy policy who, in turn, benefit financially from 
the current lack of social housing.   
"I think where our properties are I've got a certain kind of clientele, they're all ex-council properties, 
Oxgangs, Fir Hill" (Edinburgh landlord) 
 
As well as advisers many London landlords were also acutely aware of the ongoing and negative 
processes of gentrification and marginalization, neatly captured by the interviewee below. 
"Capping [is the biggest impact], you don't want ghettos.  You want people to live in the community 
where all walks of life would be living, otherwise we have something like what some parts of France 
has where it's all snooty nosed people there…there'll be quite a divide" ȋWestminster landlord). 
 
Advanced marginality in RCT 
The nature of the PRS figuration in RCT differs markedly.  Average house prices in the district 
are just £107,000 (around a tenth of that in Westminster) and are significantly lower than the 
equivalent figure in other areas where LHA tenants predominate.  Globalisation there has led to 
deindustrialisation, selective out-migration, housing residualisation, economic and social de-
differentiation and marginalisation.  These processes contribute in turn to territorial 
stigmatisation, which carries with it psychological consequences as 'the spatial denigration of 
neighbourhoods of relegation affects the subjectivity and the social ties of their residents as well 
as the state policies that mould them' (Wacquant, 2013b, p.12). Landlords within the area, many 
of whom are heavily dependent on LHA claimants for their lets, cannot help but be influenced by 
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this powerful stigmatizing force, which informs their interpretation of the LHA reforms, their 
attitudes to tenants, and the perceived consequences for their rental properties: 
"I think a lot of landlords are afraid to rent out at the moment, worried about conditions on properties, 
the upkeep, the expense to them and I think they're also afraid they could get stung" (RCT letting agent) 
"I've turned away every LHA claimant that's come knocking, so for the last three months we've been 
marketing it, haven't let anyone in there who's not fit" (RCT landlord). 
 
Thus, territorial stigmatisation has implications for landlord behaviour as well as that of policy 
elites detailed by others (see Wacquant, 2007; Slater and Anderson, 2012).  In much of RCT the 
housing stock is a legacy of the coalmining industry which once dominated the landscape (a 
further example of the neglect of historical social processes in the "design" of the reforms).  The 
impact of the Shared Accommodation Rate changes have resulted in an explosion in demand for 
rooms within shared properties.  Territorial stigmatisation counters against the assumed 
"market adjustment", of landlords converting properties to shared accommodation, as landlords 
expressed an aversion to Housing of Multiple Occupation.  A stigmatized housing form within a 
stigmatized area: 
"As you know in the Rhondda [the stock is] very small two and three bed accommodation…But (MOs, 
it would be a brave man to put them on the Rhondda anyway" (RCT landlord).  
 
Housing of Multiple Occupation aside, although the stigmatization of LHA tenants is fairly 
consistent across the UK, the landlord aversion to them in places such as RCT does not 
necessarily mean they will not let to them.  In many cases they have little choice.  Unlike 
Westminster, the figurational dynamics of tenant-landlord interdependence in RCT are more 
equal with landlords there in a much less powerful position than their central London 
counterparts.  The relative lack of social differentiation and the absence of alternative PRS sub-
markets (e.g. large numbers of students or migrant workers) and property uses within parts of 
RCT mean landlords are more dependent on LHA tenants, and by extension the state, for their 
rental income (Crisp, 2013).  The housing market is also markedly different, but just as 
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Westminster landlords claim that the LHA market is economically unviable, so too do RCT 
landlords.  The difference being that the impact must be absorbed by RCT landlords in the 
absence of alternative tenants. 
"You can't sell stuff up there, it's not a seller's market, 100 [of the portfolio] are ours and the rest are 
other people's, we're all in the same boat, people aren't buying up there…what we've found with the 
housing benefit rates now, they're dropping so rapidly it's become uneconomic really" (RCT landlord) 
 
Landlords in RCT, unable to alter their letting strategies, must adjust in other ways.  They 
bemoaned the "unfairness" of a policy they saw as London focussed and London made.  They 
cited the marginal differential in running costs between RCT and other parts of the UK, yet the 
impact of the shift to the 30th percentile was applied to all areas regardless of pre-reform rent 
levels (see Table 3 above).  Landlords were left with no choice but to cut back on maintenance 
and repairs as they struggled to make ends meet: 
"If I don't make any money there's no money for maintenance and you're just papering over cracks" 
(RCT landlord) "The other problem is properties fall into disrepair…and that becomes a really difficult problem for 
landlords, bad landlords: not a problem" (RCT landlord) 
 
The inevitable outcome was a gradual deterioration in the quality of housing and the living 
conditions of tenants.  In some cases, very low LHA rates coupled with negative experiences of 
arrears, property damage and absconding tenants meant that landlords were more inclined to 
leave properties empty.  Figures for 2012/13 show that RCT contained 2,480 empty homes, a 
massive 12 per cent of the total for the whole of Wales.23  RCT was not immune to the 
globalisation of housing investment, but outcomes for investors here were far removed from 
those in Westminster: 
                                            
23 Source: National Strategic Indicators data collection form, Welsh Government. Available online: 
https://statswales.wales.gov.uk 
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"…it's very difficult when the rent levels are going down…you're getting more and more vacant property…) think a lot of people bought from outside the area at auction, they can't really manage it 
being so far away, thought it was a great deal, now the market's dropped off they can't really sell them 
or don't want to sell them" (RCT landlord) 
 
Leaving properties empty was also an emerging tactic in other "areas of relegation" where LHA 
tenants predominate, such as the coastal district of Thanet in Kent:  
"All of us have got properties that have been empty for months…about ͺͷ per cent of the market in 
Thanet (are LHA claimants), particularly in Cliftonville, is housing benefit.  And the current housing 
benefit is nowhere near what the rented properties are; the difference is too big for the tenants to be 
able to afford the top up" (Letting agent, Thanet) 24 
 
One common process in both RCT and Westminster is that of the spatial marginalization of LHA 
tenants as they are channelled to specific areas.  The context however, is markedly different.  
Within RCT there are two different Broad Rental Market Areas (see Table 3 above): the cheaper 
PRS accommodation is further up the Valleys away from the employment opportunities 
afforded by the city of Cardiff.  The further north you go the greater the concentration of LHA 
claimants and the greater the "taint of place".   
")t's generally not acceptable for people to go from the south to the north…usually people who live in 
the Valleys want to stay there cos of support networks or employment or whatever, but you rarely see 
people from the south wanting to go up into the Valley areas" (RCT Housing adviser) 
 
The LHA cuts had contributed to this process by concentrating greater numbers of HB tenants in 
those areas of territorial stigmatization.  Though unconsidered and unforeseen by central 
government policy-makers, the local knowledge of the adviser meant that they were seen as 
inevitable from her point of view: 
"It's shifting the people that could potentially, who were able to claim prior, further up the Valleys to cheaper areas…as soon as it was announced we knew that was what was going to happen" ȋRCT 
Housing adviser) 
                                            
24 HB claimants as a proportion of the PRS actually account for 66 per cent (see Beatty et al., 2014) but the 
PRS in Thanet is still dominated by HB tenants, as the respondent rightly asserts. 
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As the adviser below notes, these consequences of the ill-thought-through LHA cuts were acting 
against decades of regeneration efforts (RCT was previously designated an EU Objective One 
area) in dealing with the fallout of deindustrialisation, economic decline and marginalization.   
 
"The European Union are trying to put all this funding in to promote and bring higher standards into 
certain areas, into deprived areas, and we're just pushing the people on the lowest income back into 
those areas because that's the only places they can afford" (RCT Housing Adviser). 
 
Perhaps counter-intuitively then, over the long term, LHA reform has a more detrimental impact 
on landlords in RCT than it does in Westminster.  Similarly, the impact on the area of RCT - 
already marginalized and stigmatized - is far more severe than that in Westminster, in terms of 
housing quality and conditions and its contribution to the process of marginalization and 
territorial stigmatisation.  Ultimately, over the long-term, the prospects for RCT look decidedly 
bleaker than that of Westminster.  The impacts in Westminster will be felt by displaced tenants 
in the immediacy, but the fallout is essentially diverted elsewhere (e.g. Barking and Dagenham, 
Thanet, Jaywick etc.) as a product of the particular PRS housing figuration which confers 
significant power to the landlord.   
 
Neoliberal housing policy and its deleterious consequences 
The immediate fallout of the LHA reforms in Westminster impinges on claimants.  LHA cuts 
could not have come at a worse time for these tenants. Massive foreign investment in the 
London PRS driving up rents, coupled with intensive competition from suppressed homebuyers 
unable to access mortgage finance, means that LHA tenants are pushed further to the back of the 
housing queue and displaced to marginal locations within London and beyond.  This 
displacement, and by extension gentrification, process is an explicit goal of the reforms (as 
detailed above) and therefore adds to existing evidence on 'state-sponsored gentrification' 
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(Allen, 2008; Uitermark, 2014; Watt, 2009).  The reduction in HB entitlements also contributes 
to the poverty of tenants as an intended outcome assumed to encourage unemployed tenants 
into work (Kemp et al., 2014).  In this sense, these outcomes would seem to support the notion 
that 'in contemporary Britain it makes sense to speak of a broken state not simply as a 
hyperbolic counterpoint to the "broken society", but because the state is making a steady switch 
from a remedial to a generative force in respect of marginality, inequality and precarity' (Slater, 
2013, p.12 - emphasis in original).   
 
In both Westminster and RCT, however, the different knock-on effects discussed above also 
manifest in a deepening of marginalization.  They testify to the inadequacy of the simplistic, 
static, ideology-driven policy assumptions characteristic of neoliberal governance, which 
appear absurd given the complexity and diversity of PRS figurations across space, which are in a 
constant state of flux.  They are triggered by state policy but they are outcomes of social 
interdependencies and unequal power relations which characterise the PRS in particular 
localities.  For example, in Westminster they impact on tenants to a much greater degree; 
whereas in RCT they impact significantly on landlords and tenants.  At the same time, in some 
areas where the PRS figuration and housing context is more suited to the reforms, the policy 
appears to have been relatively "successful" (see Beatty et al., 2014).  The range of 
consequences discussed here can be seen as a result of short-term and reactive policy design 
informed by social misdiagnosis and driven by ideological (involved) thinking which partakes in 
a 'wilful institutional ignorance' (Slater, 2013) - the government's presentation of the assumed 
responses of tenants and landlords have been shown to be inherently flawed due to the neglect of 
the social processes and interdependencies in which they are embedded.   
 
LHA reform provides a telling example of Wacquant's neoliberal state-crafting: the state 
retreats and cedes "control" to the (PRS) market which results in deleterious effects; with the 
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governmental presentation of welfare reform, of its aims and impacts differing markedly from 
experiences on the ground.  Lack of regulation of the PRS alongside rapid tenure shifts means an 
increasingly crucial, and growing, portion of the housing sector is effectively unmanaged.  The 
deteriorating "bottom end" of the PRS, marginalized and increasingly concentrated in areas of 
relegation, is the destination for growing numbers of vulnerable households, who are more 
often than not the least powerful groups within the PRS housing figuration, and society more 
generally.  Placing social processes at the centre of our understanding enables a clearer view of 
these marginalized neighbourhoods as 'time-stamped configurations whose conditions of 
genesis, development, and eventual decay are sustained and undermined by distinct 
configurations of state and citizenship' (Wacquant, 2013a, p.8).  In this sense, evidence 
presented here supports the notion that western European states have retreated to a position of 
management rather than remedy, which has emerged as a key rationality of neoliberal 
governance (Rodger, 2012; Slater, 2013, Uitermark, 2014).  One in which 'the organization of urban space plays a pivotal role…as the stigmatized poor are removed from zones of affluence 
and forced into areas of relegation' (Uitermark, 2014, p.1419). 
 
In the case of London, it could be argued that these neighbourhoods could be classified as 
emerging "anti-ghettos" (Wacquant, 2008b): porous and ethnically diverse neighbourhoods, 
characterised by internal division and undergoing a process of relegation as a result of state 
policy (Wacquant, 2008a, 2008b).  As Slater and Anderson (2012) note with reference to St 
Paul's in Bristol, the taint of stigma actually informs policy: 'the reputational ghetto in fact 
constitutes the undercurrent of local urban policy' (Slater and Anderson, 2012, p.541).  In 
contrast to places like St Paul's and Hackney however, which can be seen from above as suitable 
for gentrification (Slater and Anderson, 2012), other already "relegated" areas - on the 
periphery, isolated from the centres of economic activity and "unattractive" to private 
investment, such as RCT - can be viewed as spaces of advanced marginality (Wacquant, 2007, 
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2008a).  Spaces merely for containing HB tenants and low income households; isolated and 
excluded from labour market opportunities since the onset of deindustrialisation.  Indeed, the 
relative ethnic homogeneity of RCT, its lack of internal division and its non-urban context 
suggest it does not fit the conceptualisation of the "anti-ghetto" in Wacquant's schema (2004a, 
2008a, 2008b).  RCT, and other deindustrialised areas in Europe like it, would appear to be 
outliers worthy of further scholarly attention in contributing to and refining Wacquant's 
comparative and relational framework.   
 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown that LHA reform is indeed a generative force of marginality, inequality 
and precarity (Slater, 2013) for individuals and groups at the bottom of the class structure.  
Many of the negative consequences of the LHA reforms can be seen as the product of short-term 
policies driven by ideological knowledge of a utopian bent that envisages market-based 
"solutions" based on flawed (static) assumptions (see Chang, 2010).  The gulf between the 
simplistic governmental presentation of, and rationale for, the LHA cuts - deficit reduction, 
fairness and work incentives - and the complexity and reality of consequences on the ground is 
striking.  As Elias noted, economists and politicians 'act as if they know the answers on the basis 
of ideals' (Elias, 1994, p.48 - emphasis added).  Yet, reforming the PRS is clearly fraught with 
difficulty.  Its diversity, dynamism, complexity and unregulated nature make it difficult to grasp 
and understand; and impossibly so when approached via an ahistorical, static orientation.  
Indeed, its marginal position in the housing system means that we are so far from a sufficient 
understanding of how the PRS "works" that anticipating how policy decisions will impact 
further down the chain of social interdependencies of a sector constantly in flux is a fruitless 
endeavour.  The PRS figuration would seem to support the notion that: 
'At this early stage current levels of knowledge are perhaps only sufficient for sociologists to 
draw upon in calling into question, for example, fundamental assumptions made within policy 
discourse' (Dunning and Hughes, 2013, p.48) 
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This paper has attempted to do just that and has shown that the policy assumptions 
underpinning LHA reform are inherently flawed and contradictory.  Of course, the history of 
social aid to remediate poverty is replete with undesirable consequences for the lower strata of 
society it is supposed to assist.  Bronislaw Geremek's (1994) detailed account of attempts at 
alleviating poverty in the Middle Ages testifies to the ubiquity of undesired outcomes associated 
with European social policy from its earliest incarnation.  This history also informs of 
similarities in the shape of: the ambivalent position of the poor in the eyes of society; the 
ubiquitous uncertainty and precarity that characterises life for those on the margins; and the 
ineffectiveness of ideology-driven knowledge and policy, albeit that emanating from the Church 
in that period.  But similarities in terms of the impact on the urban form are perhaps most 
resonant for our concerns here: 
'Most striking, however, was the social division of the city's topography into rich and poor.  It 
was concentric: the closer a family lived to the religious and economic centre of the city, the 
higher its position.  The price of land was dictated by this arrangement, by which means, of 
course, the system was protected and maintained' (Geremek, 1994, p.69) 
 
500 years on these spatial and social processes continue within central London.  Though the 
policies of the neoliberal period are not as overtly hostile and repressive as previous eras in 
their spatial containment of those at the bottom of the class structure the outcomes are 
remarkably similar (Geremek, 1994; Van Wel, 1992; Wacquant, 2004a).  The poor are 
marginalized by policies that purport to help and are stigmatized for their marginal position in a 
self-perpetuating circularity that informs policy (Wacquant, 2007; Slater and Anderson, 2012; 
Tyler, 2013).  Elias's historically-informed work can contribute here through providing the 
theoretical tools with which to challenge and expose the "present-centred" myths which inform 
urban and housing policy.  And the testing of Elias's theories, hitherto neglected by urban and 
housing scholars, could likewise contribute to their development, extension, synthesis and 
refinement.   
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